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, letters to the editor 
TAX COURT DECISION UNSETTLES 
IRS SUBCHAPTER S PROCEDURES 
To the Edi tor: 
Given the crush ing case load th at its judges must face, 
it is not surprising th at from time to time th e Tax Court 
renders an op ini o n that on b ri ef reflection appears, shall 
we say, il l-advi sed. However, not since its first opinion in 
Larson ' has the Tax Court shot itse lf in the foot with the 
unerring accuracy d ispl ayed in Jon P. Smith .2 In an 
admirably brief memorandum opinion , the court has 
declared invalid tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousa nds of 
subchapter S electi ons-some dating bac k to 1958. Un-
less the court is concerned th at now that it has come to 
grips with its tax shelter case load its judges wi ll be fac ing 
underemployment, its January 13 opinion in Smith shou ld 
fol low its f irst Larson opin ion into the wastebasket labeled 
" ind iscretion s we are not gOing to li ve to regret." (For a 
summary of Smith, see Tax Notes, January 18, 1988, p . 
255.) 
The probl em comes about l ike thi s. The making of a 
subchapter S elect ion has always been a fairly tricky 
affair. While the form looks li ke it could be completed by 
the average hi gh school graduate, somehow it never has 
quite worked out that way. I have never seen any stati stics 
on the number of S electi on fo rms that the Servi ce viewed 
as inaccurately or inc orrectly completed as fil ed, but my 
experi ence suggests that t he numbers are leg ion. The 
problem of taxpayer- th at is, tax advi sor-erro r in co m-
pleteing the elec t ion form has bee n compounded by th e 
very narrow wind ow in time in which a val id election 
could be made.3 Inevitably, by the time Servi ce personnel 
identified the inadequacy in the form as fi led and returned 
it to the taxpayer, th e time for fi li ng the elect ion had 
expired . In other areas of admini stering the provisi on s of 
subchapter S pri or to th e 1982 revision, the Service 
tended to adopt surprising ly r ig id, if not downright host il e, 
pos iti ons. However, w ith regard to the f il ing of an in-
correct ly completed elect ion form, the Servi ce has for at 
least 20 years been appropriately forg iving . Defective 
forms were returned to the taxpayer along with a notat ion 
to th e effect that, if th e form was properly completed and 
returned to the Se rvi ce within a reasonable period of 
time, it would be treated as effective on the day f irst 
received . Careful practi t ioners, not ing the absence of any 
statutory bas is fo r the Se rvi ce's generosity, occasionally 
wo rri ed over whether the Se rvice was bound to respect 
the val idi ty of a c orrected form ref iled outside of the 
prescribed statutory window. I doubt that it eve r occ urred 
to anyone, however, that a taxpayer might not be bound 
by an elect ion so made. Clea rly, were the taxpayer not 
bound by such an election, th e Se rvice would have been 
unable to grant such leniency. 
[The Tax Court's1 January 13 opinion in Smith 
should follow its first Larson opinion into the 
wastebasket labeled 'indiscretions we are not 
going to live to regret.' 
' In its first effo rt in Larson , the Tax Cou rt issued an opini on 
that wo uld have treated virtu all y al l lim ited pa rtn ershi ps as 
c orporati ons, an approach that was just slig htly ahead of its 
t ime. Two weeks late r the opi n ion was withdrawn. Ulti mately, 
the cou rt reversed itse lf in an opi nion that reconfirmed th e 
formalism of the line betwee n corpo rat ions and lim ited partner-
J, ships. Larson v. Com missioner , 66 T .C. 159 (1976) acq. 1979-1 
C.B. 1. 
The taxpaye r in Smith was one of the count less bene-
fici ari es of the Service 's generos ity. The election orig inally 
fil ed in 1974 was inexplicably left unsigned. Th e Se rvi ce 
duly returned the fo rm to the taxpayer wh o ca used it to 
be sig ned and prompt ly refil ed with the Servi ce. Some 
yea rs later as defi c iency was asserted against the share-
ho lders in the S corporation, apparently att ri butabl e to S 
corporat ion items. In what all part ies must have rega rded 
as an unusuall y complete enumerati on of the grounds for 
defending aga inst the asserted defi ciency, the taxpayer 
argued that th e defi c iency could not be susta ined si nce 
the corporati on was not a va l id S corporat ion. Rather, the 
taxpayer aruged, a va lid subchapter S electi on had not 
bee n fi led with in th e statuto rily p resc ribed peri od of time 
and th e Se rvi ce lacked th e autho rit y to extend th e tim e 
fo r fi l ing a subchapter S elect ion . Astounding ly, the Tax 
Court ag reed with th e taxpayer although it reserved to 
the Se rvice the ri ght to argue at tri al that the taxpayer was 
estopped to deny the valid ity of its elect ion. 
The implications of thi s opinion should be a matter of 
great conce rn for at least the following reaso ns. ' Smith v. Commiss ioner, T .C. Memo 1988- 18 (January 13, 
1988). 
' See I. R.C. sect ion 1362(b ) 
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1. Th e Tax Co urt has dec lared every subchapte r S 
electi on fi led in accordance wi th the Service's procedures 
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to be avo idab le at the option of the taxpayer for all open 
yea rs. Whil e presu mably few of th e thousa nds of tax-
payers eligible to do so will actually wish to disown 
ret roactive ly their S elect ions ," as a matter of sound and 
practical adm ini st ration of the tax laws it is si mply un-
acceptab le that any taxpayer shou ld be granted that 
opt ion. 
It is not easy to see what useful purpose will be 
served by litigating the question of whether a 
taxpayer and the Service had the right to agree 
that an election was in substantial compliance 
with the regulations. 
The opinion in Smith appears to create two grounds 
upon wh ich the Service might defend against such at-
tempted retroactive revocations of subchapter Select ions. 
The Service argued that the elect ion in quest ion was va li d 
when f iled because the form was in "substantial com-
pl iance" with the procedura l requirements conta ined on 
the form and in the Treasu ry regu lat ions. Th e court, 
however, rejected the arg ument that a sig nature was 
merely procedura l orthat a form omitting such a signatu re 
could be in substantia l compliance with the regu lations. 
Arguably, other information requ ired by the fo rm might 
be accorded less significance and would not p revent the 
effectiveness of an elect ion . However, under Smith It 
becomes necessa ry to explo re through case-by-case 
litigation what ma nner of defect can be excused under 
the doctr ine of substantia l comp liance, for the dec Ision 
den ies to the Serv ice the right to make that determination . 
It is not easy to see what usefu l pu rpose wil l be served by 
l it igat ing the question of whether a taxpayer and the 
Service had the right to agree that an elect ion was In 
substantial compl iance with the regulations. 
Second ly, the court is apparent ly wil ling to en tertain 
the argument that the taxpayer, afte r having proper ly 
executed and refi led its elect ion and thereafter operated 
as an S corporation for six or , perhaps, 16, years , is 
estopped to now deny that the corporation Is a va lid S 
corporation. Again , however, that determinat ion for both 
thi s and other taxpayers wi ll requi re case -by-case litiga-
t ion invoking the obscure and not wel l understood ru les 
govern ing estoppel. 
Unfortunately, thi s quite obvious ca use for concern in 
the wake of the op inion in Smith is on ly the most triv ial of 
concerns. 
2. The court d id not actua lly extend to taxpayers an 
opt ion to avoid the ir subchapter S elect ions. Th e court 
held all such elections inva lid. As a resu lt, it is not only 
open to taxpayers to avoid the i r S elect ions but also to 
the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, under the opinion in 
Smi th, th e Se rv ice is now free to locate eac h S corpora-
tion that took advantage of its generous refiling procedure 
and attack each of those subchapter S elect ions for al l 
open years. At this po int, there is no indication whatsoeve r 
that the Se rvice will adopt such a posit ion and it wou ld be 
"Each of thei r tax advisors, however, must explo re the poss i-
bility. 
51 8 
qu ite su rpri si ng if it we re to do so. On the other hand , 
were taxpaye rs to seek to avoid burdensome Selections, 
it could hard ly be rega rd ed as inequ itab le for the Service 
to adopt a simi lar posture. Of course, if the Service can 
argue that taxpayers are estopped from avoiding the ir S 
elec t ion s, taxpayers also should be able to argue that the 
Se rvice is estopped to deny the va li d ity of the elect ions it 
accepted. Yet the very thought of hav ing to sustain a 
subchapter S elect ion by asserting that the government is 
estopped to deny the va li d ity of th e elect ion is nothing 
less than a tax practitioner's nightmareS Th e worst night-
mare, however, it yet to come. 
3. If the dec ision in Smith stand s as a correct statement 
of the law, it will sim ply be impossible for the Service to 
co ntinue its lenient atti t ude towa rds the fi li ng of S elec-
tion s. If refiled elect ions have no binding effect on either 
the taxpayer or the government, inviti ng such ref i lings 
becomes a folly, if not a fraud, and the practice wou ld 
have to be terminated . As a resu lt, in the future elections 
bearing tr ivia l defects cannot be saved . They will simply 
not be effective for the year for which they were f i led B 
That alone shou ld produce a min iboom in ma lpract ice 
l itigation . The worst, however, is yet to come . 
Presumably . .. all elections that were tech-
nically defective when made for any of a wide 
range of reasons, but nevertheless were ac-
cepted by the Service, must now be regarded as 
invalid . ... 
4. Taxpaye rs can bung le a subchapter S elect ion in 
quite a w ide variety of ways . Incorrect ly comp leting the 
election form sca rce ly exhausts the poss ibil it ies. Indeed , 
the blunder current ly in vogue is for the benef iciary of a 
so ca l led qua lified subchapter S trust to fai l to make the 
se parate election w ith respect to the trust that is necessary 
to make the trust a qual if ied S corporation shareholder. 7 
Wh ile the recent revi sion of subchapter S granted the 
Se rvice the authority to overlook unintentiona l termina-
tions of subchapter S elections,a there is no correspond-
ing statutory author it y authorizing the Service to over look 
faulty elec t ions. As has been po inted out elsewhere ,9 it is 
not easy to arg ue that a corporat ion that never made a 
valid election can be treated as inadvertent ly term inating 
its election, thereby becom ing elig ib le for the statutory 
rel ief. The Se rvice has bravely attempted to bridge that 
statutory omission. In a series of private rul ings the 
Serv ice has found taxpayers to be in substantia l com-
pl iance with the statutory provisions, and thus, conc luded 
that the elec t ion was effecti ve .1O If the deci sion in Smith 
' For some bedtime reading, see Automobile Club of Michigan 
v. Commissione r, 363 U.S. 180 (1982); and Green v. Cag le, 85-2 
U.S.T.C. sect ion 13,634 (1986). 
GUnder current law, the election may be effect ive for the 
fo llowing year. I.R.C. sections 1362(b)(2) and (3). 
' I.R.C. section 1361(d)(2). 
"I.R.C. section 1362 (1) . 
9Coven, Making Subchapter S Work, Tax No tes, July 21 , 1986. 
pp. 271, 274. 
lOSee, e.g., L TR 8802067 and L TR 8753030. 
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stands, it seems unlike ly that the Service w ill be able to 
cont inue this equally leni ent po licy. If an unsigned S 
election does not constitute su bstant ial compl iance w ith 
the statutory provisions, it is not easy to see how an 
unfiled trust elect ion can con sti t ute substantial com-
pliance. Presumab ly, therefore, as matters now stand, al l 
elections that were techn ica lly defect ive when made for 
any of a wide range of reasons, but neverthe less were 
accepted by the Service, must now be regarded as invalid 
and both avoidable by the taxpayer and subject to chal-
lenge by the Service. 
5. The implications of the decision in Smith do not end 
with subchapter S. Read more broadly, the opinion stands 
for the proposit ion that whenever the Internal Revenue 
Service has not held a taxpayer to rigid litera l comp li ance 
with statutory or regu latory requirements, the action 
taken may, decades later, be chal lenged by either party. 
Nothing cou ld be more corrosive of the integrity of the 
administration of the tax ing system. 
The decision in Smith does not serve the best interests 
of taxpayers or the Service or the Tax Court . The decision 
is clearly bad as a matter of tax policy. It will seriously 
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undermine the ability of the Service to administer the tax 
system in a fair and reasonab le manner. Moreover, the 
decis ion is equa lly unnecessary as a matter of law. 
However, the election in Smith was valid ly executed . 
Admittedly , an election fi led out of time may be invalid 
because the Serv ice lacks the statutory authority to 
extend the time in which the elect ion may be made. 
However, the election in Smith was originally fi led in a 
time ly manner. The conclusion that the prompt but un-
timely addition of a signature to the tim ely fil ed election 
in accordance with the long-established procedures of a 
government agency does not constitute substantia l com-
pliance with the statutory requirements is the product of 
a blind and se lf-de structive formalism. The Tax Court 
shou ld serious ly cons ider withdrawing and rethinking its 
pos ition in Smith. 
Sincerely, 
Glenn E. Coven 
Professor of Law 
College of Wil liam & Mary 
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